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SUMMARY 
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This paper examines the processes of building cooperation in a context of sparse public-
sector regulation. The Nigerian and Ghanaian food sectors are characterized by a highly 
dispersed and fragmented system of micro-entrepreneurs from diverse ethnic groups 
who both compete and cooperate in order to flourish.  Drawing on ethnographic 
research, we consider the relationships and contracts that require an element of cross-
cultural trust, how personal social relations and institutional forms are used to ensure 
trust, and the role of cultural norms.   Our empirical findings indicate that individuals 
draw on both personalized social relations and institutional forms of trust that are 
underpinned by culture specific norms. Through personalized trust, traders have been 
able to operate across cultural boundaries, building common norms of behavior over 
centuries, and shaping these into what are perceived essentially as professional, albeit 
personalized, codes of conduct and semi formal institutional forms (such as 
associations) that function in parallel to the state. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Nigerian and Ghanaian food sectors are characterized by a highly dispersed and 
fragmented system of micro-entrepreneurs from a range of ethnic groups who both 
compete and cooperate in order to survive and grow. The fragmented nature of the 
sector necessitates a range of cooperative forms in order for the enterprises to gain 
access to information, finance, quality products and market spaces. The traders involved 
are found to have a number of different types of bilateral relations (joint ventures and 
informal reciprocal arrangements) both within cultural groups and crossing cultural 
boundaries. These may be combined with multilateral forms of cooperation in powerful 
trader associations some of which are of single ethnic groups while others cut across 
ethnic boundaries.   
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The issue of ethnicity is particular interesting in the case countries as both nations are 
made up of a large number of different ethnic groups resulting in much of the long 
distance trade between rural and urban areas taking place across cultural boundaries. 
There is thus a degree of unfamiliarity in early stages of relationships which requires a 
greater degree of trust because of the inherent risk and vulnerability. These boundaries 
have also been areas of contestation and tension in the past. While Ghana has a record 
for relative harmony between ethnic groups1, in Nigeria there have been sporadic 
outbursts of considerable violence, one such episode taking place in the middle of the 
longitudinal study reported here.  
 
The process of building cooperation is particularly interesting in the two case countries 
as it occurs in a context with minimal legal recourse or regulation by the public sector. 
The role of the state is relatively weak in each case, with a large proportion of business 
being carried out without written contracts and/or other forms of formal institutional 
support. In response, traders have developed parallel systems to reduce the high 
degrees of uncertainty.   
 
These two cases offer an opportunity to explore the following questions concerning 
issues of building trust and institutional forms in different cultural contexts: 
 What are the relationships and contracts that require an element of trust across 
cultures? 
 How are personal social relations and institutional forms used to ensure trust across 
cultures? 
                                                          
1
  Ethnic troubles in northern Ghana continue to result in sporadic violence, but this rarely occurs on the 
scale evidenced in Nigeria.   
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 What are the roles of cultural norms in the development of relationships across 
cultures? 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL GROUNDING 
 
The chapter draws on theoretical and conceptual insights from a range of social 
sciences, including anthropology (on how culture, social structures and social networks 
shape organizational forms), economic sociology and economics (on economic 
institutions, transaction costs and how economic activity is embedded in social relations 
and relationships of trust), and  management studies (on how businesses operate and 
entrepreneurs behave). 
 
Drawing on literature on the processes of economic development, the case studies 
demonstrate the social institutions that shape economic life (Hodgson, 1988) and allow 
us to consider the roles of traders as actors being shaped by the structural context in 
which they operate (Granovetter, 1985; Long 1992). Culture plays a central role in how 
they carry out business and there is a need for greater understanding of how traders 
cross cultural boundaries. Culture is a nebulous and contested concept but for the 
purposes of this paper can be defined as the collective programming of the mind 
distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from another (Hofstede, 
1996), where the group/category can be a nation, region, profession, organisation, 
department, gender or generation. For this study, we look at those aspects of ethnic 
culture that shape the way boundaries are crossed and collaboration and trust is built. 
These include social norms that steer behavior, values, sanctions on others in the 
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community, and reward systems, which in turn shape the process of collaboration. In 
addition to ethnic cultural differences, the analysis of supply chain relationships also 
demonstrates a range of professional cultural differences between traders of various 
kinds and positions in the marketing chain, as well as between farmers and traders 
(Eaton et al. 2007);Masuku and Kirsten 2003).  
 
Relationships and contracts requiring an element of trust across cultures 
 
Cross cultural relationships present an interesting avenue in which to explore trust. Trust 
can be defined as an expectation of others’ behavior (Gambetta, 1988: 217; Humphrey 
and Schmitz, 1996; 5; Zucker, 1986: 54) with confidence based on personal 
relationships or knowledge that there are institutions that can ensure or enforce 
expected behavior. Trust also requires an element of willingness to embrace 
vulnerability and expectation that the other party will act responsibly (see Mayer et al, 
1995; Rousseau et al, 1998). Well-placed trust is based on active enquiry, often 
extended through questioning and listening over time, rather than blind acceptance 
(O’Neill, 2002: 76).  This may be a conscious action based on calculations of 
vulnerability, risks and rewards, or it may be more instinctive based on habitual action 
(Lyon, 2006; Mollering, 2006). 
 
In an African context there is a limited literature about food marketing organisations and 
their cross cultural relationships, despite the fact that they play a major role in the 
national economy, as well as being central figures with regard to food security. With 
regard to finance, personalized trust-based informal sources are vital, as banks are 
unwilling to lend to small scale traders (Lyon and Porter, 2007; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 
1998.  Informal sources of financing are vital to keep trade moving although they can be 
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used exploitatively if individuals become tied into debt relations over many years 
(Bhaduri, 1986; Clough, 1981,1985; Watts, 1987).  Food market traders often form 
associations which have a number of roles. These include providing welfare support for 
traders, building market infrastructure, sharing market information and lending to each 
other (Smith and Luttrel, 1994). They may also be the arenas for setting prices and 
ensuring the rules of the market are followed (Clark, 1994). They play specific roles in 
dispute resolution (Lyon, 2003; Whetham, 1972) and are responsible for hiring private 
security guards, often part of youth vigilante groups (Gore and Pratton, 2002).  
 
Of particular interest in this study are the boundary spanners and intermediaries who 
can cross ethnic and professional cultural boundaries. There are considerable 
challenges to crossing cultural boundaries; what Zaheer (1995) refers to as the “liability 
of foreignness” and Child et al. (2002) as “psychic distance”. These challenges include 
an unfamiliarity with the other culture and potential cultural hostility. 
 
Personal social relations and institutional forms for ensuring trust across cultures 
In terms of addressing the second objective of examining the social relations that ensure 
trust, this paper explores both the personal relationships and the institutional bases of 
trust. Many relationships within and between organisations involve informal relationships 
of trust. These can be contrasted with institutional forms of trust, where there is trusting 
behavior because there are institutions that can play a role in safeguarding any 
interaction and limiting opportunism. However, in many cases there are elements of both 
trust and contract-with-trust often preceding the development of contracts (Klein 
Woolthuis, 2005).  
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Personal trust is particularly important where “transactions are so complex that law 
cannot possibly cover all contingent circumstances” (Moore, 1994: 819), where legal 
mechanisms are harder to use and where there are no formal systems of contracts 
available. In such cases, more informal personalized relationships become increasingly 
important for reducing uncertainty. Personalized trust is based on an assessment of the 
other party’s actions and characteristics, information from third parties, and from direct 
interactions with them (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; Lyon, 2006; Zucker, 1986).  
 
With personalized trust, cooperation is ensured through a balance of wanting to act 
reciprocally and being coerced into action due to the sanctions and control exerted by 
the other party. The outcomes of trusting for each individual will depend in part on the 
specific balance of power achieved between the parties.  This supports Mollering’s 
(2005) view of the duality of trust and control, in which both assume the existence of the 
other. 
 
Trust can also be based on institutional forms whereby actors can build confidence 
without having a personalized relationship. The institutional forms allow one party to take 
action against another if an agreement is not honored. Institutionally based trust is built 
up through ensuring that those relying on these institutions perceive them to be 
trustworthy and able to sanction norm breakers. Institutionally based trust is most 
frequently underpinned by state- developed and enforced legislation. In the food 
marketing context, the Food and Agriculture Organization (2001) and Cullinan (1997) 
divide these into enabling functions (laws of contract, property rights, exchange and 
security/collateral), economic regulatory functions (laws of unfair competition/cartels, 
weights and measures, quality, and tax) and constraining functions to avoid socially 
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undesirable consequences (consumer protection, urban planning, environmental 
protection).  
 
As institution based trust rests on the perception that the institutions themselves are 
trustworthy, it may operate best when these institutions are invisible or perceived to be 
inevitable (Searle, 2005).  However, in a Nigerian context, government related regulatory 
forms have been associated with widespread corruption and, in the food sector, a lack of 
capacity for enforcement (Mustapha and Meagher, 2000:36).   This has led to loss of 
trust in these forms of institutions. They have been abandoned, where possible, in favor 
of parallel non-state forms of regulation that encourage institutional based trust, such as 
trader associations and transport unions.  These relationships may exhibit elements of 
both personalized and institutional based relationships as each party may draw on what 
they know personally, as well as on the safeguards of the institutions (formal and 
informal).  Furthermore, there is not a clear distinction between institutional and personal 
trust.  Personalized forms can include relationships between groups of people (as 
opposed to bilateral relationships between two people), which become more like 
institutions when operating at a larger scale. Examples of relationships based on 
personalized links include groups of friends or groups of individuals all well known to a 
trusted guarantor. Larger scale examples include trader or other business associations.  
 
The role of cultural norms in the development of relationships across cultures 
The final research question relates to the cultural norms in personal relationships and 
institutions. Building trust is culturally specific as it involves norms and values (Gibbs et 
al. 2007). Discussions on the nature and formation of norms underlying trust are 
restricted as they are intangible and difficult to observe. Norms define what actions are 
deemed to be right or wrong, and include customs of cooperation, reciprocity and 
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interaction with strangers. Furthermore, norms cannot be produced at will and their 
creation and shaping depends on the cultural background to the relationship, including 
the market exchange context (Harriss-White 1996:318). 
 
For personal trust, the act of reciprocity is a norm of behavior that involves an element of 
altruism or benevolence, and an ethical decision that is not solely based on self interest 
(Sayer, 2004). Indeed, trustworthiness may be regarded a duty and part of being a good 
and honorable person. Trust is also based on sanctions for those breaking norms, with 
enforcement only possible with social consensus (Brennan and Pettit, 2004), as there 
are norms that dictate what are appropriate sanctions given the particular circumstance.  
Sanctions may take the form of peer pressure, shaming, damaging personal reputations 
and exclusion from economic or community activities, through to physical threats and 
actual bodily harm (Porter and Lyon, 2006). 
 
The production of norms is based on what Platteau (1994: 536) refers to as “historically-
rooted cultural endowments”, upon which norms of a more generalized morality can be 
encouraged when the right conditions arise. Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993:1324-5) 
use the term ‘bounded solidarity’ which can lead to “the emergence of principled group-
oriented behavior ...If sufficiently strong, this emergent sentiment will lead to the 
observance of norms of mutual support, appropriable [sic] by individuals as a resource in 
their own pursuits.” Shared norms and organizational conventions support trust building. 
However, where trust is built across professional boundaries, these culture specific 
values cannot be so easily drawn on.  Nonetheless, it may be possible to build them up 
over time.  
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RESEARCH METHOD 
 
The empirical work took an ethnographic approach and was carried out through two 
case studies. The Ghana case involved data collection in four urban markets between 
1995 and 1999. The greatest attention was given to Kumasi market while shorter studies 
were undertaken in Sunyani, Techiman and Accra. These markets were selected 
because of their importance in national marketing systems for agricultural produce, 
especially tomatoes.  A total of 200 interviews were undertaken in Ghana. The Nigerian 
case involved research conducted on the Jos Plateau in 2001 and 2004, but builds on 
earlier work conducted by the authors in this region and elsewhere.  Eighty interviews 
were undertaken with vegetable farmers and diverse types of vegetable trader in rural, 
peri-urban and urban markets.   
 
Open-ended questions were used that allowed respondents to describe specific 
experiences in their own words. The traders were interviewed in the markets and while 
they were visiting the farmers. Locating the traders when they had time to discuss their 
work was difficult and a random sample could not be taken. It was necessary to build up 
relationships with traders over several years. This was achieved by regular visits. Data 
collection also involved a considerable amount of observation of market transactions and 
dispute settlements; what Hollier (1986) refers to as “lurking”. The rationale here is that 
collective action and the social relations of a particular context are best understood by 
following explanations of important events and disputes by traders themselves. Small 
focus groups were used to explore key issues in detail and took place in the market 
association sheds. These were informally organized and included between three and 
eight traders who were present at the time. 
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 Interviews were conducted in English where spoken by interviewees or using 
interpreters. The researchers were sensitive to their position as outsiders and to 
potential influence of interpreters from different ethnic groups. These biases were 
minimized by ensuring a range of methods were used (interviews, observations, informal 
discussions) combined with a sampling of interviewees that allowed comparison and 
cross checking of issues from multiple sources. 
 
The 2001 Nigeria study occurred at a time of considerable tension, with severe conflicts 
taking place several months later.  In early 2004 we undertook a follow-up study and 
were struck by the ease of access for researchers and  the recovery of (urban and peri-
urban) markets, post conflict, on the Plateau, though we were unable to access rural 
markets because of continuing unrest in remoter locations.    
 
Data analysis drew on grounded theory with careful analysis of comments and the 
reaction of respondents, particularly in those cases where they were asked questions 
that related to habitual behaviour. Data from a questionnaire survey of 127 wholesale 
traders in Nigeria (2001) and 37 traders in Ghana (1999) are also drawn on. In each 
case, the informal nature of the marketing system meant that no adequate sampling 
frame could be established, since traders are constantly arriving or leaving the market 
and physical market boundaries in West Africa are  commonly highly porous, being open 
to entry and exit from diverse points (Barrett 1988:14). Research assistants were 
consequently asked to interview each wholesaler they met as they progressed through 
the market concerned, until it closed for the day:  i.e. our aim was to obtain responses 
from the full population of traders present on the day of the survey, but given the fluidity 
of the population concerned we cannot guarantee that our data refers to the full 
population.  The response rate was remarkably high with only a handful of direct refusals 
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[though traders not wishing to be interviewed may have simply moved away before we 
reached them].  
 
 
 
 
THE CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF THE CASE STUDY AREAS 
 
There is a diversity of market types ranging from village markets to bulking markets and 
large urban markets. The perishable nature of vegetables means that there are fewer 
intermediaries and produce may be bought from farmers by itinerant traders who take it 
direct to the urban centres where it is sold on to retailers. This can reduce the time taken 
to reach the consumers and the risk of losses.  
 
One of the most striking aspects of the vegetable marketing system is the dominance of 
women in Ghana and southern Nigeria.  This is reported in other sectors in Ghana, 
Nigeria and many other African countries (Attah et al, 1996;   Clark, 1994; Horn, 1994; 
Onyemelukwe, 1970; Trager, 1981; 1985). Trager found that the “market place is 
historically the domain of women in Yoruba society. Beliefs and institutions recognize 
women’s importance in the market” (Trager, 1985: 280).  However, in Hausa and other 
Moslem-dominated markets in northern Nigeria, men are far more prominent, especially 
in the larger-scale perishables trade.   
 
The Ghanaian case study involves the trading relationships between farmers growing 
vegetables in the Brong Ahafo Region and traders coming out of the large conurbations 
such as Kumasi and Accra. The area has a long tradition in commercial agriculture and 
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private trading, particularly with the arrival of cocoa as a cash crop in the early twentieth 
century.  A market system evolved based on historical approaches to trade and growing 
urban markets. This has been centred on self employed independent trades building 
relationships with farmers. 
 
There has been evidence of trade in Ghana for the past 1000 years. This has led to 
dramatic social changes over time and the development of economic activity that 
involved long distance trade and the development of trading networks that stretched 
throughout West and North Africa (Chamlee-Wright, 1997: 14;  Hymer, 1970: 39; 
Lovejoy, 1974; Mikell, 1989a).  Trade was central to the colonial expansion, encouraging 
the development of trade routes and infrastructure. The state played an increasing role 
in the marketing of cocoa and staple food crops particularly in the post independent 
period (Hansen, 1989). Growing constraints were placed on the informal marketing 
system as market traders were seen as the cause of agricultural decline. The role of 
traders came under increasing pressure in the late 1970s and early 1980s as markets 
were destroyed and traders pushed out, most notably in Accra and Kumasi (Clark, 1994; 
Robertson, 1983). 
 
Tomato producers are predominantly from the Brong ethnic group, who moved into the 
Brong Ahafo area with the expansion of cocoa production in the twentieth century. There 
are also many Ashantis who moved from Kumasi and Mampong areas (Hilton, 1960:29-
30). The traders are from the main urban areas to the south of the producing areas and 
include Ga traders from Accra, Ashantis from Kumasi and Fantes from the southern part 
of Ghana.  
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In the Nigerian case there is clear ethnic differentiation within the vegetable production 
and marketing system. In the Jos urban markets Hausa traders still dominate, so far as 
vegetables are concerned, because of their enormous experience in this trade and their 
extensive networks which reach across West Africa. Hausa farmers also dominated 
production until about 10 years ago, when indigenous Berom expanded production, 
taking back land that had been rented to Hausa farmers (Porter et al., 2003). However 
the area has a wide range of other ethnic groups.   
 
The Jos Plateau experienced considerable in-migration in the colonial period, associated 
with the importation of labor from other areas of Nigeria for tin production. Currently, 
there are immigrants who have lived on the Plateau for several generations, and 
therefore feel that the Plateau is their home state, although they are not indigenes. 
There are also newcomers (first- generation migrants), and temporary migrants who 
come to participate in the vegetable industry on a seasonal basis. For the most part, 
these immigrant groups – notably Hausa, Kanuri, Ibo and Yoruba – had managed to co-
exist alongside each other and with the indigenous Berom and other Plateau ethnic 
groups remarkably peaceably. However, friction has grown with the decline in tin 
production, the movement of settled immigrant populations out of mining into farming 
and the expansion of dry season migrations of Hausa farmers to the Plateau. Thus, 
while religious tensions between Moslems and Christians were, ostensibly, the touch 
paper which sparked serious riots in Jos city in August/ September 2001 and again in 
November/December 2008, ethnic tensions around access to land and trade probably 
form an important backcloth to these disturbances in which many hundreds of people 
were reportedly killed.  
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FINDINGS: RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTRACTS REQUIRING TRUST ACROSS 
CULTURES 
 
The two case studies demonstrate a range of arenas where trust across cultures is 
central to the operation of the marketing system. While ethnic culture is most 
pronounced in the longer distance relationships, the relationships between each type of 
actor in the marketing chain require the crossing of professional cultural boundaries as 
well. The marketing chain (set out in figure 1) summarizes the range of avenues that are 
operating in both of the case studies. There are differences between the two cases, 
however, particularly in terms of the role of commission agents and rural bulking 
markets. These were found to be important parts of the Nigerian system with 
commission agents providing much funding for farmers. This was not found to the same 
degree in Ghana, where long distance traders often form relationships with farmers 
directly.  Common to both case studies were a range of arenas where trust was required 
to overcome the risk of opportunism. These are set out in table 1. 
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Where formal legal contracts and agreements cannot be enforced by a legal system, 
more informal personalized trust relationships become increasingly important in order to 
reduce uncertainty. For example 68% of wholesale traders in Ghana and 56% of traders 
in Nigeria were providing long term credit to supplier farmers usually coming from 
different ethnic groups. Surveys of 159 Ghanaian farmers found that 10% were receiving 
credit from traders (Lyon, 2000). No evidence of recourse to legal structures was found 
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and interviewees reported that they were reliant on trust. The amounts of credit provided 
are considerable for the farmers, with the figure of £125 reported in table 2 representing 
up to 5 months income for a farm laborer. The money lent out is also a large proportion 
of the trader’s capital, in a context where banks are unwilling to lend to either farmers or 
traders.  
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Credit systems in Ghana were found to flow both ways, with 68% of farmers giving 
produce on credit to traders although there are considerable differences between 
villages. Table 3 below also shows a majority of traders taking produce on credit from 
producers and paying later. A majority of traders were also selling produce on credit in 
Ghana. A comparison with the Nigerian case shows a difference in the proportion of 
traders providing credit and receiving credit. The lower proportion of traders involved in 
these trust based credit system in Nigeria may be due to both the greater risks found in 
Nigeria, and the differences in the marketing chain allowing a greater amount of spot 
purchasing rather than long-term relationship building.   
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
PERSONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FORMS USED TO ENSURE TRUST 
 
The empirical findings show that individuals draw on both personalized social relations 
and institutional forms of trust.  Personalized trust is shown to be based on having 
information on the other party and the ability to sanction those that do not behave as 
expected. On the one hand this is a calculative process, but our data show that in many 
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cases people trust based on instinct and reported that they had not thought about the 
issue until asked about it by a researcher.  
 
Traders take considerable risks in lending to people who could disappear and the issue 
of personalized trust was often identified by interviewees as a way to reduce this risk. To 
build up trust, traders have to gather information about the farmers’ prior behavior and 
also have sanctions or potential ways of putting pressure on them if they try to avoid 
repaying. In this way they balance both controls and goodwill or benevolence 
(Nooteboom, 2004).  
 
The types of relationships that are drawn on are existing relationships through kinship, 
community or church links, working relationships built up over time, friendships that 
come out of the working relationship, and intermediaries who are known to both sides. 
Information leading to personalized trust  is gathered on the competence of the person 
to repay by visiting the farm, assessing its size and asking others about their ability as 
farmers. By working together the farmers and traders learn more about each other. One 
(male) trader in Nigeria stated: “ I know him - in and out of season we are all together”. 
Information about the person’s character and behaviour is also gathered from people in 
the recipient’s community and traders may go to visit the village and the farmer’s house. 
This allows traders to meet the family members and other villagers. If there is a problem 
with repayment, traders can use the family members, leading farmers in the village, or 
the village head, to settle disputes and put social pressure on the farmer. Meeting family 
members also acts as a proof of giving the loan. In Nigeria, some farmers were 
additionally being asked to ‘sign evidence before collecting’ [i.e. put a signature or mark 
on a written statement confirming receipt of the loan before it is handed over]. 
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The sources of information for personalized trust may also come from using 
intermediaries, particularly the elders of the different types of associations. These 
intermediaries are able to build on bilateral relationships and allow multilateral 
relationships to evolve through being a guarantor.  In this boundary spanning role they 
cross ethnic and professional boundaries and facilitate the building of trust based on 
their personal relationships. However, these personal relations become more 
institutional as the scale of the boundary crossing increases. This demonstrates the lack 
of a clear distinction between institutionally based and personalized trust, especially with 
respect to the role of intermediaries.  
 
Institutional-based trust is built on organizational forms that have regulatory roles and 
allow confidence in others’ actions without personal relations. These include trader 
associations, traditional chieftaincy systems and community leadership and allow 
individuals to take action against others if an agreement is not honored. These 
institutions tend to become parallel institutions to the state as public sector-supported 
institutions are not perceived to be trustworthy due to the high degree of corruption.  
 
The two case studies found no formal legal basis for any of the transactions but 
contracts are partly enforced by trader associations operating as parallel institutions to 
the state. These organisations also regulate the market place through settling disputes, 
regulating the activities of the intermediaries and controlling the use of the market space. 
In Nigeria they played a role in organizing private ‘vigilante’ security groups and in 
Ghana they were also providing forms of insurance.   Trader associations were found to 
vary, with many markets having an umbrella association that included a wide range of 
other associations divided along commodity lines, which in turn may be subdivided into 
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autonomous groups for retailers and wholesalers. The associations were therefore 
playing a boundary spanning role between different professional cultures. 
 
 While power can be drawn from mutual action in the market associations (i.e. there is a 
collaborative side to power in the form of social solidarity which enables trust in the 
collective, Arendt 1958), it will not necessarily operate positively for all traders.    In the 
Nigeria case, the expanding role of local Berom and other Plateau people in the 
vegetable trade has been achieved despite the evident dominance of Hausa traders in 
Jos urban vegetable markets.  In this case the ability of smaller players to mobilize 
against a greater force (a possibility which Arendt also observes) was presumably 
feasible because of the collaborative, integrative (ethnic) resources of the less 
established Berom trader group. 
 
CULTURAL NORMS THAT INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIPS 
 
Norms define what actions are considered acceptable or unacceptable and are therefore 
the basis of building and maintaining personalized trust and institutions in themselves. 
Norms of reciprocity are the most commonly referred to in this study, particularly with 
regard to customer relationships. These relationships, frequently between people from 
different ethnic groups, were found to be able to withstand the serious conflict between 
ethnic groups which occurred in Jos in 2001, even though the origin of the conflict was 
linked to resentment against traders of a particular ethnic group. 
 
These norms of reciprocity were often referred to in terms of friendship and obligation to 
others. In Nigeria, co-operation in long distance trading relationships is frequently 
cemented through landlord relationships whereby the trader of one ethnic group will 
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reside with another ethnic group while his/her goods are being sold (Cohen, 1971; Hill, 
1971; Mortimore, 1989:131). This provides a sense of security, even if the landlord takes 
some advantage of his client’s limited knowledge of local conditions and languages: 
“The [Ibo] dillali that takes you to his house personally has shown great concern. There 
are many thieves in the east. If you go to lodge and get attacked you won’t return to him. 
So you are safe…. You go back to him because of the relationship between you, even 
though he has cheated you. If you go to another place it could be even worse. … he 
respects me because I help him earn a living” (driver/farmer from Tudun Mazat, Barikin 
Ladi district, talking about the 6-year business relationship with his Ibo dillali based in 
Onitsha, January 2004). In Ghana, the forms of reciprocity and obligations were 
cemented through attending church together and most importantly, through attending 
funerals of a family member of the other party. These are large events where the 
number of guests is a sign of status and financial contributions are provided to the cost 
entailed. In such cases the common norms of professional cultures over-rode the ethnic 
cultural boundaries. 
 
Other important professional cultural norms include keeping agreements, avoiding 
deception, not stealing customers or outbidding fellow traders. The studies also 
identified norms related to modes of interaction with strangers with an expectation on 
traders to welcome buyers and sellers and treat them fairly. However, the definition of 
what is considered fair was found to be open to interpretation in the different case 
studies, with further differences between markets, between commodities and changes 
over the season as goods become more or less abundant. The moral norms regarding 
the relationship between competitor traders are strongly enforced as this allows the 
markets to operate without descending into chaos and results in traders regarding those 
carrying out the same activities as colleagues rather than competitors.  
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Norms can be applied consciously and rely on altruism and benevolence, as well as 
social consensus to enforce sanctions on those that break them. The roles of 
associations in each case study demonstrate common forms of social consensus and 
punishing norm breakers. The sanctions or motivations may also come in the form of 
shame, peer pressure, and fear of a damaged reputation that would limit access to 
support from other traders in the future (for example for credit or for settling disputes). 
Individual traders are therefore pressured into keeping to norms by those around them. 
This can be done by withdrawal of co-operation, disapproval and attaching social stigma 
to norm breakers.  
 
Pressure can also be exerted through forms of authority. The strength of this authority is 
based on their own set of norms that include common beliefs, values, traditions and 
practice that result in the recognition of the authority’s right to command. Norms of 
leadership are adapted from common forms of behaviour of those involved. Examples 
include the form of the trader associations, drawing norms of leadership found in the 
chieftaincy system in Ghana. The Ghanaian associations, dominated by women traders, 
had market queens, referred to as ‘ohemma’. Their roles and operations draw on the 
Ashanti and Brong cultural-specific practices where a leading woman plays a key role in 
traditional chieftaincy. 
 
While norms may be enforced through sanctions, there are also norms that determine 
which sanctions or forms of coercion are acceptable. The ability to make threats and 
carry them out is shaped by the norms of what is deemed acceptable behaviour. In 
Ghana’s Central Region, individuals claimed they were restricted from taking forceful 
action against people from their own community as they did not want a confrontation and 
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to ‘get a bad name’ (Lyon, 2000). On the Plateau we heard similar sentiments 
expressed: “there have been a few cases [of stealing]. We send them away. We don’t 
take them to the police station because we have been together.  Maybe if you can 
recognize your mistakes and promise not to do it again… if you repent you can stay” 
(Hussain, loader at Building Materials market).   
 
Obligation to cooperate or reciprocate is also based on common norms to support family 
or fellow workers or community members.  These norms may be very different to the 
accepted norms of how others are treated, as seen in the case of the loaders above. 
This demonstrates the importance of considering the plurality of norms dependent on the 
existing and emerging relationship of the two parties. Traders were found to draw on 
these obligations to follow norms by visiting a customer’s house and getting to know 
other family members and community members who might be able to put pressure on 
the customer should there be any problems in the relationship.  
 
In the Nigeria study area, the role of religion (both Islam and Christianity) has been 
increasing in importance. Traders suggest religion shapes their own moral approaches, 
but it does not appear to be substantially reshaping how and with whom the vegetable 
business is transacted post the 2001 crisis.   The issue of Islamic sharia law, while very 
important in other parts of Nigeria, was not mentioned by anyone we interviewed, 
although this may be due to the sensitivity of the subject following the conflict and 
ongoing tensions. 
 
DISCUSSION   
Implications for practice 
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This chapter has set out how trust can be built up between cultures in unpromising 
circumstances created by multiple cultural nodes and boundaries, and a lack of formal 
institutions. The multiple cultural boundaries include those related to ethnicity, profession 
(different types of trader and position in the marketing chain) and gender that actors 
have to cross in order to participate in markets. In many regions a large proportion of 
traders are women who have specific cultural approaches to interaction and regulation of 
market places.  
 
The ethnic cultural differences are particularly important in an African context as in most 
African countries there is considerable ethnic diversity. Markets are often the major 
points of interaction for these ethnic groups, and the trust based relationships 
established in trading, act as a means of creating ties and avoiding wider community 
conflict. However, where there is ethnic tension, market places have been found to be 
triggers for widespread ethnic conflict in Nigeria, while at the same time acting as a 
means of bringing conflicting groups together again to build peace (Lyon et al, 2006). 
This suggests that attention could profitably be given to the dynamics of trader 
interactions in ethnic conflict prone areas, since knowledge and understanding of local 
cross-cultural trading practices and associated points of tension and cooperation may be 
of value in developing broader initiatives to defuse conflict and build peace.    
 
Lack of state based formal institutions results in traders and farmers having to rely more 
on personalized relationships and the development of semi-formal institutions such as 
trader associations.  Traders can draw on institutional forms of trust (such as enforcing 
contracts and uniform measures) in order to build confidence without having a 
personalized relationship. The institutional forms allow one party to take action against 
another if an agreement is not honored. Institutional trust is built up through ensuring 
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that those relying on these institutions perceive them to be trustworthy and able to 
sanction norm breakers.  This demonstrates the importance of understanding both the 
personalized and institution-based relationships that occur in most examples of trust. 
These are identified in the case studies but can also be found universally (Bennet and 
Robson, 2004; Mollering, 2002; Zucker, 1986). This challenges approaches that present 
different cultures as being either ‘high’ or ‘low’ trust. The findings here demonstrate the 
importance of making a distinction between personalized and institution-based trust, 
each of which may vary between high and low in different contexts.  
 
Directions for future research  
The cases presented in this chapter demonstrate high degrees of personal trust and low 
institutional trust.   Nigeria and Ghana present relatively unique contexts for exploring 
the issues of trust and cultural norms, but the study can contribute to wider theoretical 
discussions of trust and control between organisations and within organisations. In other 
cultural contexts there may be high institutional trust and lower personal trust (often as a 
result as the higher institutional trust). In some African contexts such as Zambia and 
Tanzania, there is also some evidence of lower personal and institutional bases of trust 
(Porter, Lyon and Potts, 2007; Tillmar and Lindkvist, 2007).   To explore this differential 
development of institutional and personal trust in different contexts, case study research 
in a diverse set of African regions would be valuable.  In such research a historical 
perspective is likely to be extremely important for learning how trust may be built, but 
also how it may be undermined or destroyed.  Such a perspective on cross-cultural trust 
building will demonstrate the importance of cultural context while at the same time 
identifying those factors and conceptual frameworks that transcend culture.  
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There are considerable cultural differences across Africa as in Europe,  although there 
has been little research assessing these issues with regard to building trust.  Lane and 
Bachmann (1996) found relatively high institutional trust in a Germany inter-firm supply 
context and relatively low institutional trust by comparison in UK. Furthermore, there are 
differences within individual African countries, and within particular professions or 
sectors.  This means that we cannot refer to an Africanist approach to trust building any 
more than we can refer to a European approach. Detailed research is therefore needed 
on the  culture-specific or emic dimensions to building trust (Zaheer and Zaheer, 2006) 
operating at a national and sub-national level.  
 
There is also a need for research to identify some generalizable findings that can 
contribute to a universalist theory of trust. While that is a larger project that has not been 
attempted in this chapter, this study shows that there are elements of trust production 
that can be found in all cultures, most notably the balance of personal and institution 
based trust, the balance of wanting to act reciprocally and being coerced into 
cooperation, and the role of locally specific norms. These norms and the response to 
norm violation will vary from culture to culture and affect the development of trust in 
different ways.   
 
Concluding comments 
With both personalized and institutional trust, cooperation is ensured through a balance 
of wanting to act reciprocally and being coerced into action due to the control exerted by 
the other party. The nature of reciprocity is based on norms of behavior, customs and 
‘rules of the game’.  In the case studies, control is based on peer pressure (shame within 
a community and reputation protection), authority of informal organisations (penalization, 
exclusion from market spaces) and in some cases, strength (physical or in numbers).  
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There is evidence of both norms of cooperation (reciprocity, keeping agreements, 
friendship etc) and norms of sanctions (acceptance of authority, acceptable types and 
strength of sanctions). Furthermore, the way reciprocity and control are used is not only 
calculative, as people are found to act on instinct and out of habit.  
 
Our case study research emphasizes the importance of taking a historical perspective to 
understanding trust because norms may vary over time and be applied in different ways.  
This resonates with Lane and Bachmann’s (1996) observation (in comparing trust 
relationships in a European industrial context) that structures are socially constructed in 
a long historical process.  In Europe, as in an African context, for instance, there can be 
a rapid change when marketing systems are disrupted by conflict, by a changing political 
context, or by changing technology (such as mobile phones). This plurality of norms in 
our case studies is seen when comparing relationships between community members 
and relationships with distant others. While norms of reciprocity may be expected to be 
stronger in local communities and amongst relatives, there are also more limitations on 
what sanctions can be applied if there is any case of opportunism. This results in people 
preferring to do business with non-relatives.  
 
There is, therefore, a central role for cultural norms to play. Incentives are necessary for 
trust based relationships but are often not sufficient. Trust across cultural boundaries 
thus has to identify the common norms, and where norms of behavior may be different, 
each party has to adapt to the other. In the two case studies, relationships across 
cultures were found to have been built on common norms of behavior that had evolved 
over time and were perceived as professional cultural norms amongst similar types of 
traders. In both case studies, the norms have been built on a long history of intercultural 
exchange over long distances. 
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Table 1 Trust and opportunism in vegetable production and marketing  
Trust arena Potential opportunism 
Farmers receiving 
credit from traders  
Not repaying, diverting sales to other traders, not 
reducing price for trader as agreed 
Bargaining Farmers and traders withholding information on supply or 
prices from the other party 
Paying for produce 
after harvesting 
Traders reducing the price negotiated with farmers after 
they have harvested 
Diverting harvested 
produce to traders 
with higher prices 
Farmers negotiate a price to harvest for some traders 
and more traders come offering higher prices. Farmers 
can dump the earlier traders' boxes and harvest for the 
higher price 
Low quality produce Farmer hides grass, rocks and  unripe or damaged 
tomatoes in the crate 
Traders take on credit Traders ask to take on credit and do not return. Traders 
return saying the price was low in the market and so 
cannot pay the full amount 
Trader associations Trader does not cooperate with association members. 
Stealing customers of other traders in the market 
Sales to retailers Retailers fail to pay later after taking goods on credit or 
cannot pay the full amount 
(Adapted from Lyon, 2000) 
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Table 2 Trader credit to farmers 
 Ghana case study Nigeria case study 
N N=37 N=127 
Percentage of traders giving 
credit to farmers 
68% 56% 
Average number of farmer 
customers being given credit 
4.6 4.0 
Average amount given 
(converted to pounds) 
£125 £50 
 
 
 
Table 3: Traders buying and selling goods on credit 
 
 Ghana case study Nigeria case study 
N N=37 N=127 
Percentage of traders 
receiving produce on credit 
68% 57% 
Percentage of traders selling 
produce on credit 
76% 50% 
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Figure 1 Urban marketing chain and cross ethnic cultural links 
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